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PREFACE
The idea for this Strategy Research Project developed gradually during the first three months at the U.S. Army War College, Class of 2004. Iraq was in turmoil. While "decisive operations" had triumphed in seemingly record time, post-conflict/reconstruction operations appeared "bogged down" in a kaleidoscope of violence ranging from looting, suicide bombers, and outright insurgency. Editorials became fond of using Vietnam comparisons. Initially, I became interested in delving into the complexities of "winning" the peace.
Preliminary research into Phase IV operations in Iraq revealed that the myriad of studies, pre-and post-war, had apparently overlooked the British experience in Mesopotamia during the First World War. I found this omission especially puzzling, since both campaigns took place on literally the very same ground. Even the increasingly a-historical mindset of the twenty-first century should have seen some "utility" in examining this earlier experience.
A comparative analysis of two case studies does not lend itself well to the limits of a Strategy Research Project (SRP). The wealth of material available on both campaigns taxed my writing abilities given the constraints on length. The completed product runs the risk of appearing superficial as a result. Nonetheless, I decided that the comparative analysis warranted completion, no matter how limited. It highlights certain, remarkable similarities between the two campaigns. Indeed, it frankly makes the failure to look at the British Mesopotamian Campaign that much more amazing.
I owe particular thanks to my advisor, Dr. Conrad Crane, Director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI). He assumed this role despite a host of other special projects and tasks. His meticulous dissection of my drafts was a priceless instrument of quality control. This SRP is a far superior product because of his dedication.
I extend the warmest gratitude to the monumentally-selfless, always-cheerful staff of the Military History Institute. They never flagged in their enthusiasm to assist my research in any way imaginable. They educated me as to just how great a national treasure the MHI is.
I encourage future researchers to delve more deeply. I thus attempted a comprehensive Selected Bibliography. More specifically, I recommend that they track down Gertrude Bell's Review of the Civil Administration. Time precluded a more diligent search on my part. United States now and Great Britain then both faced significant challenges to project and maintain military power in this part of the world. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting civil-military requirements in country. This study has restricted research to unclassified sources on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Open-source research for an ongoing campaign greatly complicated attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between ends, ways, and means, but such an option facilitated frank debate with wider dissemination.
The study considers the conduct and integration of both decisive and post-conflict operations. The paper will begin discussion of each campaign with an analysis of strategy.
What strategic imperatives necessitated the initiation of military operations in this far-flung corner of the world? What strategic assumptions dictated operational, sometimes tactical, ways and means allocated for execution? How did the strategy change over time, in particular during the course of operational execution of both decisive and post-conflict operations?
Historical analysis often carries the burden to demonstrate clear lessons. This comparative analysis did not set out to prove any specific "lessons learned." Rather, the author believes in the value of history to provide "points of departure" for problem solving and dilemma resolution. The course of research and interpretation of evidence has unearthed significant insights into the British experience then vis-à-vis the American experience now. This paper is too late to affect what has already happened in Iraq in 2003, but it provides insights relevant to the continued American presence in Iraq and for future deployments.
MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: SWEEPING SUCCESS, DISASTER, AND RECOVERY
The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the First World War was primarily an Indian Army operation. British rule in India was a very unique element of the age of imperialism.
The first section will thus provide an introduction to the British Raj and the old British-Indian success never rested upon a firm support structure. The costly repulse at Ctesiphon broke the back of the administrative services. There was an inadequate appreciation how tactical and operational success rested upon an efficient port operation at Basra and a robust transportation system to project military power and sustain it. 26 One effect was a collapse in medical support. 27 Two aspects of this logistical breakdown warrant further comment. Strategic decision makers and operational commanders and staff maintained a parsimonious, peacetime obsession with "economy," creating "an indisposition to forward or press demands" regardless of need, and too often in an atmosphere of isolation from front-line realities. They did not abandon this obsession with economy after the war started, despite the fact that Parliament had already approved funding of the Indian Army's expenses on all overseas missions conducted on behalf of the Empire. 28 Certain operational commanders and staff also squelched those who tried to demand necessary resources. The Parliamentary Commission convened to investigate the disaster at Kut thus commented sharply on the glaring failure to anticipate and expedite fixes. 29 There was also the administrative confusion of trying to manage forces who fell under two systems, Indian and British. 30 Kitchener's elimination of the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council forced the C-in-C, India and his staff to do both jobs since the administrative structure and system still functioned as if there were two separate offices. 31 The C-in-C, India could not possibly perform both jobs effectively with active operations on three continents and in the midst of its greatest expansion in its history.
Another deficiency which the Parliamentary Commission cited specifically was the unprecedented volume of correspondence among senior officials marked as "private." The Commission viewed this practice with undisguised concern. They concluded that this departure from practice in effect "dispossessed" the staffs from their superiors. The Commission believed that the staffs could have worked solutions for the logistical shortfalls more easily and faster than otherwise happened. Moreover, pushing to Baghdad constantly appeared in their discussions. 33 There was not necessarily a conspiracy by the Government of India. Events in an atmosphere of tactical and operational exploitation moved quickly. The triangle of communications flow between Mesopotamia, India, and London left ample opportunity for confusion. The Arabs were receptive to British overtures. The large Turkish administrative machinery had existed largely on paper. Recognized authority rested upon the village headman, tribal sheikh, and local seiyid. 38 Thus, local and imposed institutions had remained separate and distinct. The British could still not take Arab support for granted. Arab loyalty went to the winner; any loser was a prime subject for plunder. This reality spelled the difference between relative tranquility and a line of communications subject to constant harassment. The
Turks did use Arab irregular units, but these generally participated in conventional operations.
There was no concerted Turkish effort against British lines of communications. The threat was the Arab interest in booty. 39 The British also had to show the will to remain in the areas they conquered to maintain Arab support. Turkish retribution in a reoccupied area would have been merciless.
Certain aspects of "reconstruction" reflected military necessity. For example, Arthur
Lawley, a Red Cross Commissioner, visited Basra and Amarah in early 1916 in response to a request for assistance from the Viceroy. Lawley noted that Basra had an adequate water supply, an effective "anti-fly" crusade, and sound sanitation. The inhabitants had to conform to these regulations and benefited from them. 40 Basra was the primary seaport of debarkation (SPOD) in Mesopotamia, so the British built numerous wharves, warehouses, railroads, etc.
Basra was just one example of massive British investment in infrastructure which demonstrated the will to stay over the long haul and the generosity to make permanent improvements.
Basra eventually set the example for the rest of Mesopotamia's major cities, but the expansion of reconstruction operations all over the country was a major resource challenge following the fall of Baghdad. Politicians in London wanted to preserve the "existing administrative machinery" with participation from local representatives, reducing the British presence to an advisory function. This idea was not viable. There was no existing machinery of government, and Arabs did not come forward initially. Besides assurances of no Turkish return, they awaited news of British intentions for the government after the war. 41 The The very first British action upon entering Basra was to establish "public order" in the city. The Turkish police chief and his staff were gone; looters had sacked the city within fortyeight hours of their departure. British and Indian military police were patrolling the streets within hours of the British entry into Basra on 22 November 1914, but they were few in number.
Wilson acknowledged the challenges in forming a permanent police force. Initially, officers were
Moslem Indians from the Punjab. They successfully established civil peace by April 1915. They extended these urban patrols to Amara a few weeks later, then Naziriya. 44 Upon occupying Baghdad, the British conducted house-to-house searches for weapons and prioritized occupation of road connections and bridges. 45 The British supplemented military police and troops with two forces. Local headmen formed small patrols in the smaller towns. The British recruited an irregular, district police to patrol the hinterlands. Their name roughly came from the Persian for night watchmen. These district police proved highly successful, relieving the Army of the need to provide many road and river patrols. 46 An important step in the establishment of a viable civil administration was the painstaking collection, organization, and systematization of information. Reassigned to the Political Department, Gertrude Bell played a key role here. She classified tribal data and other details, beginning with information obtained from the Intelligence Department, then adding updates based upon the continued British advance. By February 1917, she could claim that her office had not only organized a mass of data, but all tribal and some other material was available in official circulars. They had compiled an exact accounting of the country as the British found it. 47 The process had taken eleven months.
Perhaps the soundest success story was in the legal system, which demonstrated by 58 The prize would be favorable repercussions in Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, the North West Frontier, and within India itself. This imperative appeared all the more critical in the light of the failed Gallipoli expedition and the periodic delays in the advance to Baghdad. Basra alone did not meet the strategic imperative. 59 Unfortunately, the use of the Indian Army as an imperial strategic reserve had already expended its available manpower. The Indian Army was in too many locations when the Government of India needed more troops to capitalize upon success and achieve a decisive victory. Overwhelming political need drove a strategy without commensurate means.
The end of the First World War was merely a passing event for the Civil Administration. Mesopotamia became a British Mandate by approval of the League of Nations.
Much work remained. The religious question was significant. 60 Achieving a lasting political settlement would prove difficult in the wake of regional diplomatic contradictions like the SykesPicot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, as well as the inability to find a viable, successor ruler in Iraq. 61 Nonetheless, the British Mesopotamian Campaign demonstrated the successful, simultaneous conduct of conventional combat and reconstruction operations. 66 Two aspects of that planning warrant particular examination. The first concerns the implications, tactical and logistical, of the so-called rolling start. The second concerns the nature and degree of pre-war planning for Phase IV, post-conflict operations.
IRAQ, 2003: THE STRATGEY OF PRE-EMPTION
There was considerable controversy about the operational ramifications of the rolling start. The inability to land the 4 th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Turkey to launch the northern front was a major loss of combat power. Commanders demonstrated adequate combat forces were on the ground to execute the decisive operations. However, success does not mean that more combat power was not needed. Indeed, the sheer rapidity of success with so few troops perhaps led to a lack of Iraqi psychological understanding of the depth of their defeat in so short a time. This study is more concerned with the effects on logistics and postconflict operations.
The most glaring deficiency for the conduct of decisive operations to emerge from the rolling-start nature of the campaign was a failure in logistics. Very generally speaking, bulk fuel, ammunition, food, and water sufficed, albeit to very different degrees; habitual sustainment was an overall challenge. The timely delivery of Class IX repair parts was an especially-glaring failure. 67 Logisticians at all echelons lacked timely knowledge of actual requirements, visibility of where everything was in the pipeline, and an effective transportation network. 68 There was no deliberate, tiered establishment of a logistics architecture of direct support (DS) and general support (GS) units at corps and theater levels. Worse, logistics units had no priority in the deployment sequence. 69 The sheer effort required for the results obtained to make logistics work, and the hand-to-mouth existence which ensued in certain commodities, are not acceptable standards. 70 While Iraq was very different from Afghanistan, the repetition of certain logistics challenges suggests a failure to integrate lessons learned between the operations. The breadth and depth of pre-war analysis are impressive. One think tank assessed potential human problems following war. 73 An exceptionally-detailed study identified four broad categories for post-conflict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being. 74 The U. It concluded that reconstruction would require a long-term, expensive commitment. 78 Two observations emerge from an unclassified analysis of U.S. Government, pre-war strategic planning. First, the plan for the post-conflict phase, due to factors of time available and the mental focus on decisive military operations, was inadequate for the sheer scope of the mission which in fact occurred. A "rolling-start" campaign with its emphasis on rapid "decisive action" and "shock and awe" is far divorced from the mindset to plan the minute detail of the establishment of effective bureaucratic administration and the execution of essential public services over the long term. However, of much greater significance were faulty assumptions at strategic level which refused to credit and accept the detailed, pre-war post-conflict planning.
79
Writer Michael Elliott was specific. He contended that Pentagon plans for postwar Iraq rested upon three assumptions -all three of which turned out to be false. 80 A Noontime Lecture (NTL) at the U.S. Army War College echoed the assessment concerning false planning assumptions. 81 What did all this mean on the ground? In short, the "rolling-start" campaign concept did not understand or rejected the notion that Phase IV operations required more troops than Phase III. Hence, there were no provisions for the deployment of robust follow-on forces to assume a significant security mission, e.g. more combat units and/or a military police brigade with appropriate subordinate elements. Instead, troops intended to participate in decisive operations, whose deployment was delayed, became de-facto security forces upon arrival in country. Many were already too late to prevent the bulk of the looting, but they did little to stop the looting upon arrival. 82 The decision of Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), to disband the Iraqi armed forces exacerbated the difficulties. DeBa'athification of the Iraqi military did not require total disbandment. Granted, numerous Iraqi forces simply melted away, but internal disintegration does not explain the entire story.
Disbandment created a pool of armed, unemployed Iraqis who became part of the problem. 83 Likewise, the plan should have "packaged" a significant force of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units to begin the humanitarian and stability and support operations (SASO). Admittedly, finding the correct mix and number of units was a daunting task -and will remain so. But there was no realistic alternative. The lack of international support reduced United Nations participation to a trickle. Moreover, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) did not flee Iraq only in the wake of the latest terror. The NGOs had largely abandoned Iraq as far back as mid-1992. 84 Those few present in 2003 lacked on-the-ground experience.
85
Coalition troops in fact did well in humanitarian operations -in large measure due to preparedness for worst-case scenarios. 86 However, the CFLCC commander lacked the ground forces and the direction to inaugurate other post-conflict operations with a firm hand.
American military capability in the twenty-first century is undoubted. This superiority notwithstanding, OIF, and OEF before it, appear as attempts to wage war "on the cheap."
Stated differently, Phase III decisive operations now require fewer troops than Phase IV.
However, while the former wins the war, the latter wins the peace.
"LESSONS LEARNED"
A comparison of the First World War British Campaign in Mesopotamia and the current American/coalition operation in Iraq highlights several differences as well as similarities.
In the interest of balance, this study will begin with the differences. Second, even the best efforts of the United Nations (UN) and the dedication of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations (IO) will be unable to accomplish much in the early stages. The death of a state, no matter how oppressive or how feeble, will be a traumatic experience. Invariably there will be significant infrastructure challenges, due to destruction, damage, or simple non-existence. The United States Army will remain the primary instrument of post-conflict operations during initial intervention and for an indeterminate period thereafter. Frankly, no one else has the resources to do the job.
Third, the primary post-conflict mission is to establish security. This requirement will almost always necessitate a dual task, the simultaneous conduct of decisive operations with MOOTW law-and-order missions. A political and societal power vacuum marks this sensitive period. The sooner the occupying force establishes presence, the fewer the losses to wanton looting.
Fourth, Army logistics requires significant overhauling in order to sustain the warfighter effectively in the twenty-first century. The vision for the fixes exists; the issue is funding. 94 The "bottom-line" is that the logistics doctrine which won the Cold War and the First Gulf War is not flexible enough for short-notice, expeditionary warfare. Best-business practices which created efficiencies must combine with more effective, responsive support. theater. 95 This study also recommends that such doctrine recognize the initial preeminence of the Department of Defense in an operational theater, to include the commencement of reconstruction missions, then highlight guidelines to determine the optimal period to hand over proponency to the State Department. Such a stage would still involve a security mission, etc., but the senior authority would be the American Ambassador, or some other civilian authority.
This study also highlights the utility of history. There is no evidence planners looked at the British experience. They should have. The British experience foreshadowed many problems the Americans would face.
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ENDNOTES 15 IEF D became II Indian Corps because I Indian Corps was in France. 16 There were subtle differences between an Indian division and a British division, though both had twelve battalions in three brigades. Neither had a regimental structure as in continental European divisions. The major difference was that that an Indian division consisted of nine Indian and three British battalions. The Indian battalions had similar organization to the British, but a smaller authorized strength. Division Troops allocations also varied. Indian divisions had to await the availability of British field artillery brigades, since the only Indian artillery was mountain artillery, the famous screw guns. Indian divisions were also almost wholly reliant on pack animals for transport. 
